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Online Appendix for  
“Military Technology and Human Loss in Intrastate Conflict” 
Part 1: Main results differentiated by weapon type and Summary Statistics 
1. Main results differentiated by weapon type 
The Determinants (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) 
Of Conflict Intensity MCW  
only 
MCW  
only 
Small Arms 
only 
Small Arms 
only 
Battle Deaths (Lag, LN) 0.433*** 0.406*** 0.432*** 0.422*** 
 (9.978) (9.504) (10.088) (9.629) 
Year of Conflict -0.014** -0.013** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (-2.259) (-2.046) (-3.350) (-3.346) 
Population (LN) -0.866 -1.306** -0.256 -0.377 
 (-1.346) (-2.058) (-0.413) (-0.599) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.000 0.090 0.027 0.051 
 (0.002) (0.427) (0.121) (0.230) 
Polity -0.026 -0.016 -0.037* -0.038* 
 (-1.235) (-0.782) (-1.860) (-1.885) 
Ethnically excluded 1.271** 0.903 0.015 -0.119 
Population (%) (2.179) (1.572) (0.036) (-0.275) 
Arms Import (LN) 0.080* 0.029 0.031 0.028 
 (1.842) (0.659) (1.395) (1.219) 
Rebel Strength 0.796** -1.316** 0.886*** -0.211 
 (2.179) (-2.259) (2.875) (-0.204) 
Rebel Strength x Arms Import (LN)  0.551***  0.083 
  (4.578)  (1.114) 
Constant 12.127** 16.348*** 5.410 6.588 
 (2.319) (3.155) (1.091) (1.299) 
     
Observations 472 472 490 490 
R-squared 0.273 0.311 0.268 0.270 
Number of conflics 79 79 71 71 
Table A1. Fixed-Effects-Estimations on battle deaths / year. Separate models for different types of weapons. 
Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A1 replicates our main analysis but only for the imports of one type of weapons at a 
time. Models A1-2 cover MCW while models A3-4 cover Small Arms.  These results are 
similar to those obtained when including both types of weapons at the same time with the 
exception that the interaction term Rebel Strength x Arms Import (LN) is not significant in 
model A4. However, we still find substantially the same effect as in the main models as 
indicated by figure A1. There, it becomes clear that even in model A4, governmental small 
arms imports are associated with an increase in conflict intensity when rebels are at least at 
parity but have no effect when this is not the case. 
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Figure A1: Marginal effects plots for the Rebel Strength x 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡: 𝑀𝐶𝑊𝑡 interaction term in Model A2 (Left panel) and the 
Rebel Strength x 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡: 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡 interaction term in Model A4 (Right panel). 
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2. Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Battle  overall 808.3033 1919.357 25 30633 N =     877 
Deaths between  1839.198 25 14490 n =     131 
 within  1255.649 -8641.03 16951.3 N/n = 6.69466 
Battle  overall 5.384849 1.591629 3.218876 10.32983 N =     877 
Deaths  between  1.278839 3.218876 9.362647 n =     131 
(LN) within  1.002984 .7473258 8.206612 N/n = 6.69466 
Rebel overall .0965842 .2955649 0 1 N =     849 
Strength between  .3389462 0 1 n =     126 
 within  .172712 -.7034158 .8965842 N/n = 6.7381 
Import: overall 374.7473 667.8993 0 4004.82 N =     868 
MCW between  519.5863 0 2172.94 n =     126 
 within  343.3579 -1063.473 2440.617 N/n = 6.88889 
Import: overall 2.31e+07 1.11e+08 0 1.39e+09 N =     741 
SA between  7.75e+07 0 8.11e+08 n =     111 
 within  5.17e+07 -4.89e+08 6.03e+08 N/n = 6.67568 
Import: overall 4.736594 2.081278 -2.120264 8.295254 N =     661 
MCW (LN) between  2.000882 -.095894 7.596819 n =     114 
 within  .9445632 .164954 7.743633 N/n = 5.79825 
Import: overall 14.29506 2.920394 5.420535 21.05269 N =     656 
SA (LN) between  2.597152 7.283448 20.37112 n =     103 
 within  1.777821 5.291997 19.1851 N/n = 6.36893 
Year of overall 7.478905 9.597068 0 47 N =     877 
Conflict between  6.570148 0 36 n =     131 
 within  5.537247 -16.12109 38.77891 N/n = 6.69466 
Population overall 170788.4 340242 427.39 1305239 N =     877 
 between  291398.2 427.39 1305239 n =     131 
 within  33906.07 -30959.52 354248.4 N/n = 6.69466 
Population overall 10.53973 1.691709 6.057697 14.0819 N =     877 
(LN) between  1.781324 6.057697 14.0819 n =     131 
 within  .119453 10.17639 10.91144 N/n = 6.69466 
GDP overall 599749.3 1597271 536.7 1.32e+07 N =     877 
 between  1470268 536.7 1.25e+07 n =     131 
 within  333161.7 -729444.2 2951006 N/n = 6.69466 
GDP overall 11.51423 2.03895 6.769286 16.39188 N =     641 
(LN, lag) between  2.142006 6.769286 16.33247 n =      88 
 within  .2971528 10.4597 12.52668 N/n = 7.28409 
Polity overall 1.400709 6.058801 -9 10 N =     846 
 between  5.550252 -9 10 n =     126 
 within  2.313293 -9.799291 10.65071 N/n = 6.71429 
Ethnically  overall .2547475 .2410877 0 .8793364 N =     875 
excluded between  .2121495 0 .8686869 n =     129 
Population within  .1174449 -.209899 .7165079 N/n = 6.78295 
Civil War  overall 3.485753 2.624749 0 8.08621 N =    868 
MCW between  2.2539 0 7.44091 n =     126 
 within  1.331991 -.3375683 8.677031 N/n = 6.88889 
Non-Civil  overall 1.570407 2.241731 0 6.994208 N =    868 
War MCW between  1.913719 0 6.364751 n =     126 
 within  1.265475 -3.037689 6.099693 N/n = 6.88889 
Military  overall 9.64642 5.833429 0 20.44869 N =    740 
Small Arms between  5.174283 0 20.13302 n =     110 
 within  3.128061 -2.435995 18.75777 N/n = 6.72727 
Sport overall 12.94686 5.436933 0 21.74584 N =    740 
Small Arms between  4.714172 0 20.93703 n =     110 
 within  3.499714 -.3900258 23.32489  N/n = 6.72727 
Import:MCW overall 3.653501 2.673167          0 8.295504 N =    868 
(LN, incl. between  2.330558 0 7.597321 n =     126 
Zero obs.) within  286.8994 1.324964 -.4223562 N/n = 6.88889 
Import:SA overall 12.65532    5.322452           0    21.05269  N =     741 
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(LN, incl. between   4.739298           0    20.37112 n =     111 
Zero obs.) within  3.38399 -.3696465    22.43263 N/n = 6.67568 
No Observed overall .2384793 . 4263993 0 1 N =     868 
Trade MCW between  . 3463399 0 0 n =     126 
 within  . 301281 -.6990207  1.185848 N/n = 6.88889 
No Observed overall .1147099 . 3188867 0 1 N =     741 
Trade SA between  . 2839846 1 1 n =     111 
 within  .240645   -.6545209    1.06471 N/n = 6.67568 
Import: 
MCW (LN, 
Lagged) 
overall 4.679906 2.189579 -3.912023 8.427631 N=672 
between  2.091681 -.655371 7.874146 n=111 
within  .9893415 -1.089603 7.546972 T-bar=6.05405 
Import: 
MCW (LN, 
t to t-3) 
overall 5.827094 2.261205 -1.049822 9.66211 N=765 
between  2.283757 -1.049822 9.353916 n=115 
within  .7511052 2.894894 8.502928 T-bar=6.65217 
Import:Small 
Arms (LN, 
t to t-3) 
overall 16.08354 2.604441 6.966967 22.32381 N=588 
between  2.324017 9.463062 21.61249 n=94 
within  1.397603 9.894107 20.32473 T-bar=6.25532 
Import: 
MCW (LN, 
t to t-5) 
overall 6.173731 2.298984 -1.049822 9.980054 N=793 
between  2.325762 -1.049822 9.857842 n=115 
within  .7131564 3.027821 8.590319 T-bar=6.89565 
Import: 
MCW (LN, 
t to t-10) 
overall 6.796286 2.373197 -.5108256 10.43203 N=812 
between  2.302628 1.426954 10.39448 n=112 
within  .6959151 3.053436 9.65741 T-bar=7.25 
Military overall .0210541 .0532746 .0000476 .4924979 N =     738 
Quality between  .0455376 .0005429 .4071575 n =     107 
 within  .0088769 -.0917869 .1063945 N/n =  6.8972 
Military overall 2.328223 1.282095 -3.251989 6.12213 N =     751 
Quality between  1.168424 -.787643 5.921321 n =      108 
(LN, lag) within  .4737908 -.1361232 5.01719 N/n = 6.9537 
Rebel  overall .1826952 .5271025 .0000381 5.333333 N =     597 
Strength: between  .4091799  .0000426 2.958142 n =      95 
Troop Share within  .3406663 -2.094596    2.557887 N/n = 6.28421 
Table A2. Summary Statistics of all variables used in the analysis. Note: MCW= Major Conventional Weapons, SA = Small 
Arms, GDP = Gross Domestic Product. Note: “Within” values are computed as deviations from the unit mean and can hence 
be both positive and negative. 
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Part 2: Replication of Moore (2012) 
  
 
Imports including 5 
years before onset 
 
 
Imports including 5 
years before onset 
Intervention 
model: Imports 
including 5 years 
before onset 
Intervention 
model: Imports 
including 5 years 
before onset 
 Moore Corrected Moore Corrected 
State Arms Imports 0.573* 0.077 0.639** 0.076 
(logged) (1.706) (0.825) (1.995) (0.868) 
Rebel Arms Imports 0.391*** 0.408*** 0.399*** 0.426*** 
(logged) (2.963) (2.930) (3.177) (3.258) 
Duration 0.531*** 0.562*** 0.416*** 0.466*** 
(logged) (3.969) (4.100) (3.128) (3.533) 
Population -0.152 -0.076 -0.069 0.061 
(logged) (-1.220) (-0.501) (-0.568) (0.412) 
Military Quality 0.267** 0.185 0.236** 0.147 
(logged) (2.219) (1.422) (2.054) (1.200) 
GDP (logged) -0.420** -0.243 -0.368** -0.156 
 (-2.297) (-1.186) (-2.102) (-0.801) 
Cold War 0.552* 0.466 0.422 0.323 
 (1.865) (1.476) (1.480) (1.078) 
Mountainous Terrain 0.058 0.053 0.074 0.084 
(logged) (0.510) (0.471) (0.680) (0.788) 
Democracy -0.867** -0.964** -0.822** -0.985** 
 (-2.131) (-2.255) (-2.122) (-2.449) 
Ethnic -0.912** -0.864** -0.933** -0.782* 
Polarization (-2.433) (-2.062) (-2.617) (-1.980) 
Religious  0.219 0.500 0.164 0.485 
Polarization (0.666) (1.392) (0.524) (1.436) 
Intervention   0.809*** 0.945*** 
   (2.973) (3.336) 
Constant 11.045*** 9.384*** 9.260*** 6.335** 
 (4.266) (3.005) (3.652) (2.061) 
     
Observations 87 89 87 89 
R-squared 0.571 0.518 0.617 0.580 
Table A3. Pooled OLS regression on battle deaths / year. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Part 3. Robustness Tests 
1. Using a Control Function Approach instead of Instrumental Variables  
To check the robustness of our instrumental variables regressions, we also make use of the 
control function approach. That is, we first regress our endogenous variables (the respective 
arms imports variable and its interaction with rebel strength) on all exogenous variables, save 
the residuals from these models, and then include these residuals as additional controls when 
regressing battle deaths on the endogenous and exogenous variables (see Wooldridge 2015).  
The Determinants (A5) (A6) (A7) (A8) 
Of Conflict Intensity     
     
Battle Deaths (Lag, LN) 0.419*** 0.406*** 0.412*** 0.408*** 
 (9.135) (7.166) (10.167) (9.760) 
Year of Conflict -0.005 -0.018** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 (-0.647) (-2.308) (-4.123) (-4.176) 
Population (LN) -0.276 0.227 -1.654** -1.666** 
 (-0.510) (0.325) (-2.188) (-2.222) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.173 0.066 0.091 0.092 
 (0.948) (0.352) (0.476) (0.482) 
Polity 0.012 -0.001 -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.650) (-0.065) (-0.992) (-1.026) 
Ethnically excluded -0.361 -0.543 0.519 0.517 
Population (%) (-0.829) (-1.468) (1.216) (1.212) 
ln import: SA  0.021   
  (1.552)   
ln import: MCW    0.016 
    (0.504) 
Rebel Strength: EoH -1.083*** -0.719** -0.422 -0.444 
 (-3.309) (-2.163) (-0.814) (-0.856) 
ln import: Civil War MCW -0.423* -0.419*   
 (-1.814) (-1.840)   
Rebel Strength: EoH x ln  0.629*** 0.562***   
Import: Civil War MCW (5.433) (5.146)   
ln import: Military Small Arms   0.130** 0.127** 
   (2.506) (2.379) 
Rebel Strength: EoH x ln    0.116** 0.120** 
Import: Military Small Arms   (2.184) (2.240) 
Residuals: Constituent Term MCW 0.483** 0.482**   
 (2.059) (2.104)   
Residuals: Interaction Term MCW -0.795*** -0.651***   
 (-5.572) (-3.595)   
Residuals: Constituent Term SA   -0.130** -0.129** 
   (-2.444) (-2.345) 
Residuals: Interaction Term SA   -0.077 -0.082 
   (-1.270) (-1.338) 
Constant 3.374 -0.009 12.999*** 13.103*** 
 (0.885) (-0.002) (2.675) (2.725) 
     
Observations 608 549 549 549 
R-squared 0.736 0.737 0.728 0.729 
Table A4: Control Function Approach. OLS estimation on battle deaths / year with conflict-fixed Effects. Note: GDP = Gross 
Domestic Product, MCW= Major Conventional Weapons, SA=Small Arms; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
7 
We use wild bootstrapping (Roodman et al. 2019) to correct our standard errors. Full, non-
bootstrapped results of the second stage are presented in table A4 and the relevant 
bootstrapped coefficients are presented in table A5. Results are in line with our main analysis 
and the results using Instrumental Variables. 
h0: 𝛽𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 = 0 and 
𝛽𝑅𝑆𝑥𝐴𝑡𝑚𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 = 0 
Import: Arms Rebel Strength x Import: Arms 
Model A5 z =    -1.8137 
Prob>|z| =     0.0871 
z =     5.4329 
Prob>|z| =     0.0020 
Model A6 z =    -1.8399 
Prob>|z| =     0.0621 
z =     5.1464 
>|z| =     0.0010 
Model A7 z =     2.5063 
Prob>|z| =     0.0511 
z =     2.1844 
Prob>|z| =     0.0901 
Model A8 z =     2.3788 
Prob>|z| =     0.0581 
z =     2.2405 
Prob>|z| =     0.0871 
Table A5. Results of Wald tests using wild bootstrapping. Hypotheses are tested separately. Null imposed, 999 replications, 
Rademacher weights. 
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2. Tackling the Nickell bias 
Models including both a lagged version of the dependent variable on the right side of the 
equation and fixed effects are prone to be biased due to the former being correlated with the 
error term (Nickell 1981). We use difference and system GMM estimators to make sure that 
our findings are not a result of biased estimation. The results reported in tables A6-A9 are 
produced using two different variants of the GMM estimator first developed by Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) in-/excluding time dummys. A6 and 
A7 use the original difference GMM while A8 and A9 are obtained using the later developed 
system GMM (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), estimation is carried out 
using David Roodman’s (2009) xtabond2 package. 
 (A9) (A10) (A11) (A12) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Unconditional Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
Year of Conflict 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.015 
 (1.118) (1.281) (1.168) (1.274) 
Population (LN) -1.238 -1.305 -1.191 -1.248 
 (-1.193) (-1.288) (-1.169) (-1.238) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.088 0.096 0.037 0.052 
 (0.263) (0.295) (0.111) (0.160) 
Polity -0.089** -0.080* -0.094** -0.087** 
 (-2.077) (-1.902) (-2.228) (-2.057) 
Ethnically excluded 1.184 1.362 0.960 1.130 
Population (%) (1.376) (1.611) (1.127) (1.326) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.031 0.032 0.019 0.022 
 (0.967) (1.025) (0.611) (0.706) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.183*** 0.126* 0.182*** 0.141** 
 (2.846) (1.814) (2.882) (2.018) 
Rebel Strength 0.476 -0.960 -5.555** -5.517** 
 (0.894) (-1.042) (-1.965) (-1.973) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.428*  0.312 
  (1.887)  (1.326) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.437** 0.358* 
   (2.171) (1.725) 
     
Observations 415 415 415 415 
Number of conflictid 66 66 66 66 
Time Dummies No No No No 
Table A6. Difference GMM estimation on battle deaths / year. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, MCW= Major 
Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
The two estimation procedures differ in how they treat unconditionally included arms 
transfers variables: Results obtained with difference GMM indicate that the import of MCW 
has a significant unconditional positive impact on the number of battle-related deaths. System 
GMM turns this around as imported MCW and Small Arms fail to reach conventional levels 
of significance in all models. Turning to the interaction of rebel strength and the two arms 
import variables, the coefficients of the interaction terms generally mirror these obtained 
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using a fixed effects set-up with a lagged dependent variable in both direction and 
significance. The constituent terms measuring imports to governments fighting weak 
insurgents are also mostly identical to the ones reported in the main results table. The only 
exception is that the effect of Small Arms imports obtained using the system GMM is 
insignificant. 
 
 (A13) (A14) (A15) (A16) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Unconditional Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
Year of Conflict 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.008 
 (0.264) (0.597) (0.451) (0.667) 
Population (LN) -1.455 -1.594 -1.580 -1.662 
 (-0.659) (-0.737) (-0.725) (-0.768) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.197 0.222 0.135 0.166 
 (0.594) (0.685) (0.411) (0.510) 
Polity -0.108*** -0.096** -0.110*** -0.101*** 
 (-2.731) (-2.481) (-2.817) (-2.583) 
Ethnically excluded 1.223 1.344 0.883 1.042 
Population (%) (1.464) (1.643) (1.063) (1.258) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.029 0.029 0.015 0.017 
 (0.890) (0.882) (0.461) (0.527) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.183*** 0.099 0.180*** 0.116* 
 (2.875) (1.445) (2.869) (1.688) 
Rebel Strength 0.880* -1.342 -7.201*** -7.322*** 
 (1.724) (-1.484) (-2.735) (-2.799) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.639***  0.488** 
  (2.945)  (2.163) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.578*** 0.465** 
   (3.126) (2.436) 
     
Observations 415 415 415 415 
Number of conflicts 66 66 66 66 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table A7. Difference GMM estimation on battle deaths / year. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, MCW= Major 
Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Turning to test statistics
1
, our results appear generally valid as the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term consistently indicate only first-order 
correlation in differences – as could be expected (Roodman 2009: 119). Exceptions here are 
models A18, A22 and A24. Sargan tests for overidentifying restrictions also do not reject the 
null hypothesis of the models being correctly specified (Baum 2006: 201). Hence, we 
interpret the findings obtained using difference and system GMM estimators as broadly 
corroborating our previous results with the possible exception that the effect of Small Arms 
may be put somewhat into doubt by System GMM results.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 These are available from the authors upon request. 
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 (A17) (A18) (A19) (A20) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Unconditional Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
Year of Conflict 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (4.164) (4.242) (4.179) (4.300) 
Population (LN) -0.651** -0.617** -0.605** -0.547** 
 (-2.467) (-2.378) (-2.229) (-2.051) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.188 0.188 0.128 0.108 
 (0.873) (0.891) (0.570) (0.493) 
Polity 0.087** 0.092*** 0.083** 0.087** 
 (2.517) (2.708) (2.327) (2.514) 
Ethnically excluded 1.259* 1.273* 1.537** 1.646** 
Population (%) (1.869) (1.929) (2.131) (2.328) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.041 0.043 0.050 0.056* 
 (1.267) (1.366) (1.501) (1.714) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.092 0.043 0.098 0.039 
 (1.346) (0.579) (1.407) (0.527) 
Rebel Strength 0.708 -0.469 3.745 3.295 
 (1.409) (-0.527) (1.491) (1.337) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.378  0.466* 
  (1.587)  (1.882) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   -0.217 -0.289 
   (-1.235) (-1.641) 
Constant 8.248*** 8.054*** 8.233*** 7.990*** 
 (5.918) (5.874) (5.805) (5.740) 
     
Observations 502 502 502 502 
Number of conflictid 87 87 87 87 
Time Dummies No No No No 
Table A8. System GMM estimation on battle deaths / year. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, MCW= Major 
Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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 (A21) (A22) (A23) (A24) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Unconditional Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
Year of Conflict 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 
 (4.413) (4.991) (4.452) (4.988) 
Population (LN) -1.095*** -1.076*** -1.124*** -1.072*** 
 (-4.854) (-4.893) (-4.981) (-4.814) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.754*** 0.774*** 0.802*** 0.767*** 
 (3.824) (4.022) (3.969) (3.848) 
Polity 0.037 0.040 0.039 0.039 
 (1.221) (1.338) (1.301) (1.323) 
Ethnically excluded 1.009 0.868 0.824 0.893 
Population (%) (1.543) (1.361) (1.217) (1.339) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.061* 0.052 0.053 0.053 
 (1.840) (1.600) (1.570) (1.585) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.039 -0.033 0.036 -0.033 
 (0.612) (-0.498) (0.558) (-0.501) 
Rebel Strength 0.672 -1.733** -1.489 -1.446 
 (1.376) (-2.144) (-0.626) (-0.618) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.745***  0.753*** 
  (3.683)  (3.560) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.153 -0.022 
   (0.929) (-0.131) 
Constant 6.116*** 6.051*** 5.994*** 6.068*** 
 (4.522) (4.589) (4.453) (4.577) 
     
Observations 502 502 502 502 
Number of conflictid 87 87 87 87 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table A9. System GMM estimation on battle deaths / year. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, MCW= Major 
Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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3. No controls 
While it is standard to include control variables to avert omitted variable bias, this approach 
has also been criticized (Clarke 2005). In our case, controls decrease sample size due to 
missing observations and lags. We re-run our models while excluding all control variables. 
Results are presented in table A10 and mirror those obtained in our main specifications. 
 (A25) (A26) (A27) (A28) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Un-
conditional 
Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.023 0.024 0.009 0.017 
 (0.854) (0.929) (0.335) (0.638) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.103** 0.033 0.094** 0.041 
 (2.126) (0.673) (1.985) (0.847) 
Rebel Strength 0.926** -1.563*** -5.186*** -4.251*** 
 (2.501) (-2.624) (-3.306) (-2.718) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.671***  0.547*** 
  (5.235)  (3.804) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.421*** 0.217* 
   (4.005) (1.858) 
Constant 4.483*** 4.820*** 4.738*** 4.889*** 
 (10.558) (11.559) (11.226) (11.713) 
     
Observations 515 515 515 515 
R-squared 0.028 0.087 0.064 0.095 
Number of conflicts 88 88 88 88 
Table A10. OLS Estimations on battle deaths / year with conflict-fixed Effects. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, 
MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
4. Including Zero Trade Observations 
In our main specifications, we log arms imports without adding 1 to import values, resulting 
in zero observations being set to missing in the logged import variables. This was done as 
zero reported imports may arise from two different sources. On the one hand, a country may 
genuinely not import any weapons in a given year even if this seems unlikely given that it is 
engaged in armed conflict. On the other hand, it may import weapons but neither itself nor the 
exporter may report this to any of the public databases used by SIPRI and NISAT to collect 
their datasets. Including zero observations should thus correspond to a substantially higher 
measurement error. Here, we investigate whether this approach affects our results. We thus 
add 1 to all import values before logging them, resulting in a substantially larger sample. To 
deal with the issue that cases with zero observed imports are special as they may be 
heterogeneous, we include dummy variables indicating such cases. We then re-run our main 
models, results are presented in table A11. There, the effect sizes of arms imports are 
somewhat smaller but their general positive effect on conflict intensity conditional on rebels 
being at parity remains statistically significant. 
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 (A29) (A30) (A31) (A32) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Un-
conditional 
Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
ln Battle Deaths, lagged 0.369*** 0.340*** 0.363*** 0.342*** 
 (8.903) (8.144) (8.799) (8.166) 
Year of Conflict -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (-3.513) (-3.594) (-3.664) (-3.630) 
Population (LN) -0.227 -0.439 -0.260 -0.424 
 (-0.378) (-0.734) (-0.434) (-0.707) 
GDP (Lag, LN) -0.007 0.032 0.001 0.030 
 (-0.035) (0.153) (0.005) (0.143) 
Polity -0.043** -0.038* -0.039** -0.037* 
 (-2.186) (-1.930) (-1.978) (-1.887) 
Ethnically excluded -0.035 -0.206 -0.133 -0.219 
Population (%) (-0.094) (-0.551) (-0.355) (-0.585) 
No observed Imports: MCW 0.337 0.330 0.345* 0.334 
 (1.644) (1.628) (1.689) (1.644) 
No observed Imports: Small Arms 0.401 0.381 0.502 0.419 
 (1.312) (1.259) (1.631) (1.362) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.031 
 (1.519) (1.367) (1.373) (1.333) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.097* 0.083* 0.099** 0.086* 
 (1.958) (1.692) (2.021) (1.740) 
Rebel Strength 0.493* -0.099 -0.082 -0.226 
  (-0.312) (-0.227) (-0.620) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.310***  0.271** 
  (3.343)  (2.499) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.067** 0.024 
   (2.313) (0.700) 
Constant 5.378 7.511 5.712 7.358 
 (1.113) (1.558) (1.187) (1.524) 
     
Observations 549 549 549 549 
R-squared 0.215 0.233 0.224 0.234 
Number of conflicts 75 75 75 75 
Table A11. OLS Estimations on battle deaths / year with conflict-fixed Effects. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, 
MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
4. Lags and Imports summed over previous years 
Arms imports may be expected to not only have an effect in the year they are delivered but 
their effect should remain over the following time period. In addition, Major Conventional 
Weapons may necessitate training before being put into action meaning that they may actually 
matter only after some time has passed after their delivery. We thus test how results change 
when arms import values are summed over t and the three preceding years (table A13). We 
also check what happens when MCW import values are lagged by one year (table A12) and 
when they are summed over t and the preceding five or ten years (table A14). This second test 
is impossible for Small Arms Imports as it decreases our sample size to a great extent due to 
the NISAT data being available only from 1992. In contrast, SIPRI’s data on MCW imports 
14 
spans back to 1950. Results remain consistent with our expectation that arms imports increase 
conflict intensity when rebels have reached at least parity. 
 
 (A33) (A34) (A35) (A36) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Un-
conditional 
Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
ln Battle Deaths, lagged 0.429*** 0.416*** 0.421*** 0.403*** 
 (9.280) (8.942) (9.296) (8.875) 
Year of Conflict -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.026*** 
 (-4.077) (-4.018) (-3.989) (-3.902) 
Population (LN) -0.623 -0.960 -0.794 -1.253* 
 (-0.860) (-1.301) (-1.118) (-1.735) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.096 0.160 0.127 0.213 
 (0.407) (0.672) (0.549) (0.921) 
Polity -0.036 -0.035 -0.038* -0.038* 
 (-1.549) (-1.527) (-1.692) (-1.682) 
Ethnically excluded 0.679 0.773 0.787 0.922 
Population (%) (0.881) (1.007) (1.042) (1.231) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.026 0.033 0.009 0.017 
 (1.035) (1.325) (0.371) (0.692) 
Import: MCW (Lag, LN) 0.090** 0.076* 0.115*** 0.100** 
 (2.226) (1.876) (2.866) (2.491) 
Rebel Strength 0.816** -0.609 -5.443*** -7.976*** 
 (2.198) (-0.789) (-3.344) (-4.312) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW (Lag)  0.321**  0.420*** 
  (2.103)  (2.790) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.408*** 0.451*** 
   (3.945) (4.359) 
Constant 8.240 11.239* 9.937* 14.042** 
 (1.383) (1.844) (1.699) (2.350) 
     
Observations 414 414 414 414 
R-squared 0.312 0.321 0.342 0.356 
Number of conflicts 63 63 63 63 
Table A12. OLS Estimations on battle deaths / year with conflict-fixed Effects. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, 
MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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 (A37) (A38) (A39) (A40) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Un-
conditional 
Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
ln Battle Deaths, lagged 0.294*** 0.282*** 0.285*** 0.281*** 
 (5.929) (5.707) (5.777) (5.684) 
Year of Conflict -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (-4.345) (-4.190) (-4.059) (-4.047) 
Population (LN) -0.028 -0.373 -0.583 -0.618 
 (-0.034) (-0.441) (-0.676) (-0.717) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.131 0.187 0.231 0.234 
 (0.514) (0.734) (0.904) (0.914) 
Polity -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.089*** 
 (-3.687) (-3.728) (-3.703) (-3.718) 
Ethnically excluded 0.441 0.457 0.549 0.527 
Population (%) (0.683) (0.714) (0.856) (0.821) 
Import: Small Arms (LN, t and three before) -0.090*** -0.088** -0.093*** -0.091*** 
 (-2.616) (-2.561) (-2.731) (-2.657) 
Import: MCW (LN, t and three before) 0.061 0.043 0.067 0.055 
 (0.861) (0.611) (0.956) (0.775) 
Rebel Strength 0.931** -1.590 -10.245** -8.395* 
 (2.231) (-1.342) (-2.244) (-1.726) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.420**  0.244 
(t and three before)  (2.272)  (1.102) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.636** 0.447 
(t and three before)   (2.458) (1.443) 
Constant 4.158 7.438 9.117 9.551 
 (0.593) (1.044) (1.257) (1.315) 
     
Observations 408 408 408 408 
R-squared 0.253 0.264 0.266 0.268 
Number of conflicts 57 57 57 57 
Table A13. OLS Estimations on battle deaths / year with conflict-fixed Effects. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, 
MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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 (A41) (A42) (A43) (A44) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
t to t-5 
uncond. 
t to t-5 
Interaction 
t to t-10 
uncond. 
t to t-10 
Interaction 
ln Battle Deaths, lagged 0.402*** 0.387*** 0.421*** 0.413*** 
 (9.781) (9.433) (10.527) (10.276) 
Year of Conflict -0.011* -0.011* -0.012* -0.012* 
 (-1.659) (-1.684) (-1.835) (-1.860) 
Population (LN) -0.622 -0.860 -0.675 -0.713 
 (-1.141) (-1.573) (-1.298) (-1.372) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.053 0.107 0.106 0.122 
 (0.257) (0.527) (0.537) (0.614) 
Polity -0.019 -0.021 -0.026 -0.031* 
 (-1.009) (-1.162) (-1.460) (-1.729) 
Ethnically excluded Population (%) 0.218 -0.221 0.272 0.189 
 (0.527) (-0.506) (0.761) (0.524) 
Import: MCW (LN, t and three before) 0.028 -0.027 -0.081 -0.111 
 (0.443) (-0.416) (-1.178) (-1.569) 
Rebel Strength 0.419 -1.088* 0.253 -0.503 
 (1.457) (-1.845) (1.010) (-0.970) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.292***  0.129* 
(t and three before)  (2.920)  (1.664) 
Constant 9.284** 11.782*** 9.874** 10.402** 
 (2.146) (2.692) (2.372) (2.496) 
     
Observations 563 563 581 581 
R-squared 0.194 0.208 0.205 0.210 
Number of conflictid 74 74 74 74 
Table A14. OLS Estimations on battle deaths / year with conflict-fixed Effects. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, 
MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
5. Robust Standard Errors 
We have not previously tackled the possible issue of heteroskedasticity. To alleviate this 
concern, we use conflict-clustered standard errors in a further robustness test. This also further 
accounts for interdependencies over time inside one conflict. The results of the interaction 
models mirror those obtained using conventional standard errors as the interaction terms 
between arms imports and rebel strength remain highly significant and positive while the 
constituent terms measuring the effect of government arms imports where insurgents are weak 
do not reach conventional levels of significance.  
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 (A45) (A46) (A47) (A48) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Un-
conditional 
Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
ln Battle Deaths, lagged 0.422*** 0.389*** 0.404*** 0.385*** 
 (5.029) (4.583) (4.846) (4.568) 
Year of Conflict -0.026** -0.024* -0.025** -0.024* 
 (-2.128) (-1.940) (-2.057) (-1.920) 
Population (LN) -0.480 -1.056 -0.764 -1.107 
 (-0.450) (-1.122) (-0.754) (-1.147) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.039 0.154 0.085 0.158 
 (0.143) (0.582) (0.315) (0.589) 
Polity -0.041 -0.032 -0.039 -0.033 
 (-1.387) (-1.108) (-1.380) (-1.142) 
Ethnically excluded 1.158 0.787 0.481 0.471 
Population (%) (1.436) (1.246) (0.678) (0.687) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.030 0.037 0.021 0.031 
 (1.028) (1.277) (0.722) (1.061) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.122* 0.056 0.113* 0.064 
 (1.797) (1.002) (1.854) (1.133) 
Rebel Strength 0.836 -1.622*** -4.765*** -4.355*** 
 (1.248) (-4.805) (-3.000) (-5.421) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.603***  0.485*** 
  (7.203)  (5.421) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.373*** 0.214*** 
   (3.081) (3.498) 
Constant 7.059 12.547* 10.103 13.219* 
 (0.806) (1.688) (1.241) (1.726) 
     
Observations 405 405 405 405 
R-squared 0.297 0.342 0.326 0.350 
Number of conflicts 65 65 65 65 
Table A15. OLS Estimations on battle deaths / year with conflict-clustered standard errors and conflict-fixed Effects. Note: 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product, MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
6. Military Quality 
While Rebel Strength: Equal or Higher already measures insurgents’ power vis-a-vis the 
government, we additionaly include a variable Military Quality measuring the quality of 
government forces as the ratio of military expenditures to military personnel. This has been 
done in previous studies of conflict intensity (e.g. Lacina, 2006) and offers more information 
on governemnts’ military capabilities than a simple dummy. Data on military expenditures are 
sourced from SIPRI (2017) while military personnel figures come from the Correlates of War 
Project’s National Material Capabilities Data, version 5.0 (Singer et al., 1972). Military 
Quality is logarithmized and lagged by one year. Results are presented in table A16 and 
corroborate our expectation that arms imports increase conflict intensity only when rebels 
achieve parity. 
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 (A49) (A50) (A51) (A52) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Un-
conditional 
Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
ln Battle Deaths, lagged 0.415*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.381*** 
 (8.635) (8.037) (8.128) (7.916) 
Year of Conflict -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (-2.988) (-3.068) (-3.086) (-3.102) 
Population (LN) 0.563 -0.018 0.274 0.042 
 (0.700) (-0.022) (0.346) (0.052) 
Military quality (Lag, LN) -0.277** -0.228* -0.245* -0.227* 
 (-2.107) (-1.738) (-1.891) (-1.743) 
GDP (Lag, LN) -0.270 -0.174 -0.228 -0.188 
 (-0.970) (-0.626) (-0.832) (-0.682) 
Polity -0.052** -0.049* -0.051** -0.050* 
 (-2.017) (-1.919) (-2.010) (-1.958) 
Ethnically excluded 1.287* 0.845 0.658 0.573 
Population (%) (1.792) (1.165) (0.905) (0.785) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.053* 0.060** 0.042 0.048* 
 (1.879) (2.140) (1.501) (1.694) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.093* 0.069 0.090* 0.078 
 (1.832) (1.346) (1.796) (1.536) 
Rebel Strength 1.216*** -1.274 -4.186*** -4.250*** 
 (2.880) (-1.348) (-2.649) (-2.692) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.517***  0.264 
  (2.935)  (1.286) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.365*** 0.284** 
   (3.543) (2.344) 
Constant -0.237 5.242 2.869 4.975 
 (-0.035) (0.759) (0.430) (0.725) 
     
Observations 381 381 381 381 
R-squared 0.327 0.345 0.353 0.357 
Number of conflicts 57 57 57 57 
Table A16. OLS Estimations on battle deaths / year with conflict-fixed Effects. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, 
MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
7. Continuous Rebel Strength 
The main analysis employs a dummy to measure whether rebels have at least achieved 
military parity with the government; this is based on an ordinal measure of rebel strength 
often used in the literature on intrastate conflict. However, some studies also propose a 
continuous measure of rebel strength, namely the estimated size of rebel troops divided by the 
number of governmental military personnel (see Wood 2010). Taking rebel troop estimates 
from the NSA data (Cunningham et al. 2009, 2013) and military personnel figures again from 
the Correlates of War Project, we replicate our main analysis using this measure instead of the 
rebel strength dummy. This has the added benefit of our results for strong rebels not only 
relying on the 10% of observations where rebels were coded as reaching at least parity. 
Results are presented in table A17 and indicate that the positive effect of arms imports on 
conflict intensity grows as rebels become stronger, thus further supporting our original 
findings. The interaction terms between Arms Imports and Rebel Strength are significant in 
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models A54 and A55. While this is not the case in model A56, plotting the marginal effects in 
figure A2 indicates that the effect of arms imports is conditioned by rebel strength. 
 (A53) (A54) (A55) (A56) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Un-conditional Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
ln Battle Deaths, lagged 0.401*** 0.405*** 0.410*** 0.411*** 
 (6.989) (7.114) (7.188) (7.224) 
Year of Conflict -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 (-3.789) (-3.742) (-3.884) (-3.816) 
Population (LN) -0.416 -0.496 -0.115 -0.254 
 (-0.458) (-0.552) (-0.126) (-0.279) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.209 0.246 0.144 0.189 
 (0.748) (0.887) (0.515) (0.676) 
Polity -0.057** -0.051* -0.059** -0.054** 
 (-2.113) (-1.918) (-2.188) (-2.010) 
Ethnically excluded 0.987 1.057 1.662** 1.543* 
Population (%) (1.291) (1.394) (2.020) (1.875) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.038 0.032 0.013 0.015 
 (1.250) (1.071) (0.390) (0.459) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.166*** 0.103* 0.158*** 0.112* 
 (3.116) (1.717) (2.989) (1.860) 
Rebel Strength: Troop Share 1.798 -0.880 -4.024 -4.592 
 (1.532) (-0.524) (-1.351) (-1.536) 
Rebel Strength: TS x Import: MCW  0.802**  0.618 
  (2.209)  (1.617) 
Rebel Strength: TS x Import: SA   0.420** 0.312 
   (2.123) (1.499) 
Constant 4.059 4.896 1.711 2.960 
 (0.530) (0.644) (0.223) (0.385) 
     
Observations 294 294 294 294 
R-squared 0.304 0.319 0.318 0.325 
Number of conflicts 55 55 55 55 
Table A17. OLS Estimations on battle deaths / year with conflict-fixed Effects. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, 
MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Figure A2: Marginal effects plots for the Interactions between Rebel Strength: Troop Ratio and 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡: 𝑀𝐶𝑊𝑡 (Left panel) 
and 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡: 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑡 (Right panel) in Model A56. 
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8. Influential observations 
We investigate whether influential observations influence our results using two approaches. 
First, we overlay the effects plot for model 4 from the main analysis with a scatter plot of 
arms imports and battle deaths. A visual inspection suggests that observations from conflicts 
137, 174, and 209 may be highly influential. We thus re-estimate model 4 without those 
conflicts. Results are reported in models A57-60 and mirror those from our main analysis. 
Second, we use bootstrapping to check our results’ dependence on specific observations, 
namely wild (cluster) bootstrapping as implemented in Stata by Roodman et al.’s (2019) 
boottest command. This is a post-estimation command, we run it after model 4 from the main 
analysis to (re)-test the Null hypotheses that the coefficients 𝛽𝑅𝑆𝑥𝑀𝐶𝑊 and 𝛽𝑅𝑆𝑥𝑆𝐴 of the 
interaction terms Rebel Strength x Import: MCW and Rebel Strength x Import: Small Arms 
equal zero both separately and jointly. We variably cluster the bootstrapped standard errors on 
the conflict. Results for this wild (cluster) bootstrapping are reported in table A19 and provide 
further support to our initial findings. 
 (A57) (A58) (A59) (A60) 
The Determinants 
Of Conflict Intensity 
Un-conditional Interaction 
MCW 
Interaction 
Small Arms 
Both 
Interactions 
ln Battle Deaths, lagged 0.397*** 0.389*** 0.390*** 0.385*** 
 (8.268) (8.222) (8.174) (8.151) 
Year of Conflict -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (-3.369) (-3.439) (-3.440) (-3.484) 
Population (LN) -1.401* -1.292* -1.338* -1.257 
 (-1.804) (-1.688) (-1.735) (-1.647) 
GDP (Lag, LN) 0.224 0.206 0.205 0.193 
 (0.921) (0.856) (0.848) (0.807) 
Polity -0.031 -0.030 -0.033 -0.031 
 (-1.238) (-1.192) (-1.315) (-1.254) 
Ethnically excluded 1.112 0.778 0.653 0.469 
Population (%) (1.568) (1.102) (0.893) (0.647) 
Import: Small Arms (LN) 0.038 0.039 0.029 0.032 
 (1.483) (1.548) (1.160) (1.290) 
Import: MCW (LN) 0.096** 0.057 0.099** 0.064 
 (2.004) (1.184) (2.093) (1.326) 
Rebel Strength -0.090 -1.709*** -3.813** -4.331*** 
 (-0.199) (-2.598) (-2.345) (-2.678) 
Rebel Strength x Import: MCW  0.577***  0.514*** 
  (3.332)  (2.918) 
Rebel Strength x Import: SA   0.267** 0.201* 
   (2.382) (1.773) 
Constant 15.188** 14.510** 14.994** 14.438** 
 (2.363) (2.292) (2.350) (2.288) 
     
Observations 397 397 397 397 
R-squared 0.257 0.282 0.270 0.289 
Number of conflicts 63 63 63 63 
Table A18. OLS Estimations on battle deaths / year with conflict-fixed Effects. Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, 
MCW= Major Conventional Weapons; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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h0: 𝛽𝑅𝑆𝑥𝑀𝐶𝑊 = 0 and 𝛽𝑅𝑆𝑥𝑆𝐴 = 0 Rebel Strength x Import: MCW Rebel Strength x Import: Small 
Arms 
Separate test, no clustering t(329)     =     3.4814                                 
Prob>|t|   =     0.0000 
t(329)     =    1.9945                                    
Prob>|t|  =     0.0080 
Joint test, no clustering F(2, 329) =    13.4336                Prob > F =    0.0000 
Separate test, clustering on conflict t(64)       =     4.9601 
Prob>|t|  =     0.0571 
t(64)       =     3.2002                                    
Prob>|t|  =     0.1011 
Joint test, clustering on conflict F(2, 64)  =    32.2983                 Prob > F =    0.0460 
Table A19. Results of Wald tests using wild (cluster) bootstrapping run after model 4 in the main analysis.  Null imposed, 
999 replications, Rademacher weights. 
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